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AI is now embedded across the cyber intrusion lifecycle

A new threat-intelligence report says AI is no longer just a tool attackers use to write malware. According to Gambit Security's "AI Across the Intrusion Lifecycle," large language models are now folded into the day-to-day mechanics of real intrusions, helping operators adapt as they move through compromised networks. The report, written by Gambit Director of Threat Intelligence Eyal Sela and researcher Nir Varon, examines three unrelated threat actors. Across the cases, the models built script

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axc
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AI is now embedded across the cyber intrusion lifecycle

A new threat-intelligence report says AI is no longer just a tool attackers use to write malware. According to Gambit Security's "AI Across the Intrusion Lifecycle," large language models are now folded into the day-to-day mechanics of real intrusions, helping operators adapt as they move through compromised networks.

The report, written by Gambit Director of Threat Intelligence Eyal Sela and researcher Nir Varon, examines three unrelated threat actors. Across the cases, the models built scripts tailored to the environments they found, developed exploitation tools, sorted through stolen business data, ran IT and DevOps tasks, and repeatedly rewrote commands based on what the compromised systems returned.

A ransomware operator put Claude Code inside the attack loop

Illustration of an AI assistant mapping high-value systems inside a compromised network

In the most detailed case, a suspected ransomware operator used Claude Code across intrusions into six organizations in June 2026, which Gambit also linked to two earlier compromises. The victims spanned industries and countries: an Australian energy utility, a financial services firm in Mauritius, businesses in South Africa, Thailand and Malaysia, and several organizations in the United States. Gambit attributed the activity with medium confidence to an affiliate of the Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service operation.

What stood out was the breadth of the AI's role. The attacker used Claude Code for reconnaissance, to generate exploitation commands and malicious scripts, to modify firewall policies, to map internal systems, and to flag which machines deserved attention: domain controllers, file servers, backup infrastructure. Once credentials were in hand, the model helped interpret reconnaissance data and locate production data inside a financial platform's databases.

The broader shift

Gambit's cases line up with a wider trend Anthropic documented. In an analysis released alongside its MITRE ATT&CK mapping, Anthropic reviewed 832 accounts tied to malicious cyber activity between March 2025 and March 2026 and found AI use spanning all 14 tactics in the framework. The share of actors it rated medium risk or higher climbed from 33 percent to 56 percent between the first and second halves of that window.

The difference from earlier AI-enabled crime is the role of the model. Instead of only drafting a phishing email or a piece of malware, these systems act more like a responsive technical aide that stays engaged as the operation unfolds, troubleshooting and redirecting in real time.

Sources

Gambit Security, "AI Across the Intrusion Lifecycle" (Aug 2026): https://gambit.security/blog-posts/ai-across-the-intrusion-lifecycle

Unite AI, "Gambit Security's 'AI Across the Intrusion Lifecycle' Shows How AI Is Moving Deeper Into Real-World Cyberattacks": https://www.unite.ai/gambit-securitys-ai-across-the-intrusion-lifecycle-shows-how-ai-is-moving-deeper-into-real-world-cyberattacks/

Anthropic, "AI-enabled cyber threats and MITRE ATT&CK": https://www.anthropic.com/news/AI-enabled-cyber-threats-mitre-attack

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